PAN MOHAMAD FAIZ

THEORIES OF JUSTICE: An Introduction

Theories of Justice seek to find what society seeks to do in relation to individuals and groups of men whose conduct it governs. Philosophers sought to make society better or possibly worse when they champion the cause of some dominant groups) by attempting to identify these criteria to guide us as to how rewards and freedoms shall be distributed in a society.

In the perception of most of academic mainstream of the West there is an essential conflict between equality and freedom. The problem of social justice, then, is to evolve the criteria of balancing the claims of equality and freedom. There are equalitarians who either prefer equality to freedom or give representation to both equality and freedom. Some give very low priority to equality.

Equality requires identification of similarities either reference to equality alone or to principles extraneous to equality. Equality, either independently, or in association with principles extraneous to equality, is one of the referents of justice. Parelman, attempted to find some common core in equality to ascertain, similarities without reference to considerations extraneous to equality.[1]

Similarities have been identified on the basis of human worth. But it is difficult to operationalise the concept of worth of man in conflicting opinions on political absolutism and distribution of rewards.[2]

Rawsl dissatisfied with the existing theories of Justice and being aware of weakness of equality as such, projected justice as fairness. Apart from equality fairness includes Liberty and rewards for services contributing to common advantage. There are two basic principles in his theory:
All participants in an institution have a right to maximum of liberty compatible with like liberty of all.

Inequalities are just only if they are for every one’s advantage. These are fair principles because they have been adopted in original position, a hypothetical state. The distribution must be guaranteed on the basic of average utility. In operation Rawls’s theory would mean that liberties shall be available to each but socioeconomic inequalities shall persist. In his theory welfare becomes a matter of right.[3] (Rawls’s theory of Justice will be explained further in details.)

F.A. Hayek and Robert Nozick give priority to liberty at the cost of complete or near complete exclusion of family. Hayek tottaly rejects the idea of purposeful and scientific social development. Economy, law, politics and morality are by products of spontaneous and even irrational human activity and abolition of welfare and monopoly institutions. Robert Nozick also believes in the efficiency of the market economy. His theory is known as theory of entitlement. Possession of things is just if title to them to be required legitimately in free market protected by law. This theory according to Nozick is non-patterned and historical.[4]

In spite of branding of social justice by Marx as a bourgeois concept in his entire theory there runs an undercurrent of the problems of social justice. For the Marxist there is not essential conflict between equality and freedom. For Christopher Caudwell equality and freedoms are complementary. Freedom is no to be conceptualized as absence of restraints but as appreciation of necessity and as a means to develop personality.[5] Marxist have two important principles of justice, namely from each different stage of socialist development. Justice is neither autonomous nor a ready made formulae. These formulae do not have any intrinsic meaning but must be understood in terms of scientific socialism.[6]

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End Notes:

[1] See Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (1965), pp. 352-339.

[2] William K. Frenkana, ‘The Concent of Social Justice’ in R. Brandt (ed), Social Justice, 1962.

[3] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1976), pp. 11-22.

[4] F.A. Hayek, Roadro Serfdom (1974); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). For a summary of the position of libertarians, see J. Stone, “Justice not Equality” in Kameka (ed), Human Rights, 1978.

[5] Christopher Caudwell, The Concept of Freedom (1977), pp. 51-75.

[6] See Wiselow Lang, “Marxism, Liberalism and Justice” in Kamenka (ed), Human Rights, 1978. Also see V.K. Dixit, “Freedom and Equality” in N.R.M. Menon (ed), Social Justice and Social Process in India (1988), p. 56.

Main Source: Reading Materials Faculty of Law, Delhi Univ.

A. CONCEPTION

1. Notion and Reasons

Reception means transplantation of one type of law onto another. The basic condition of reception is that one law should penetrate another law on a wider legal area. There are several main reasons for the reception of law, namely:

1. The basic reason for reception may be the “exhaustion” of the adaptional energies of the existing law. Example: In this situation the law has to be reformed either in the original way as after French Revolution or by way of reception, such as the reception of Roman Law in Europe, in some areas of Islam, mainly in Turkey, in some African countries after their independent.
2. Another rather widespread reason for reception is the political and economic conquest. Example: The reception of English law was so many parts of the world.
3. Reception is also somewhat influenced by the jurist if the recipient country and by their training methods. Example: The “Laussanne Group” of the Turkish or the connection of Romanian Jurists with the French at the time of the 1864 codification.
4. Some ‘technical factors’ may also play a role here. Example: The endeavours in the United States to receive French law failed because of difficulties in translation.

2. Non-Organic and Organic Reception

The form of receptions is imposed or voluntary reception. However, it is decision from the aspect of legal development, to distinguish between non-organics and organic reception.

a. Non-Organic

• This reception cannot be spontaneous and hardly can it be judicial. It needs a par of excellence legislative act. Mostly it is imposed, but not in each or every cases. Example: The Belgian reception of the French Code Civil was imposed and is still organic. While David’s code civil accepted by imperial Ethiopia was voluntary and is still non-organic.

b. Organic

• This reception, for present use, is an adaptional reception. The society responds to requirements raised by changed circumstances with reception in a voluntary way or under force. Therefore, the received law becomes a law of its own by transforming what existed and thus getting itself modified. Example: The formation of German and French bourgeois laws greatly helped by Roman law.

Distinguish between non-organic and organic reception, therefore concerns with the relationship of the receiving society and the received law rather than the relationship of other parts of the legal system and the received law, thought is not an indifferent matter either.

3. Selective Reception

An imposed law will not in all aspects be in accordance with the will of the ruling class of the colonizer. This fact often involves a so-called selectivity of reception. Example: The selectivity was realized in a peculiar way in Indonesian where only those Dutch laws were valid which had been enacted by private company (Section 95).

After reception, the received law will begins to love its own life. In the course of this process, the received law will either more or less modify or will fall to assert itself depends on certain things. They are:

1. The legal area concerned;
2. Its adaptability;
3. Whether reception is organic and the size of the gap between the social, economic, cultural ad institutional development of the law of the ‘donor’ country and that of the recipient country.
4. The policy that is pursued by the recipient country.

B. SAVIGNY THESIS

1. Volkgeist

According to Savigny, law was not something which can be made or altered arbitrarily by lawmaker. The nature of any particular system of law was a reflection of the spirit of the people (volkgeist). All law is the manifestation of this common consciousness. He wrote:

“Law gross with the growth, and strengthen with the strength of the people, and finally dies away as the nation loses its nationality”.

Savigny protested against the Reception of Roman law in Germany and codification of Roman law had been received into Germany so long ago. Therefore, its legal soul had become a mixture of Roman and local laws.

Against this, Savigny sets his thesis that a people’s law cannot be made by drafting committee, but must grow from people’s experience and character, expressing among them a ‘common feeling of inner necessity’.

In his great work, “The History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages”, he analyzes the Roman development documents to its root. And in his another great work, “The system of Modern Roman Law”, he analyzes Roman and local laws.

For Savigny, nevertheless, the true nature of law is best seen in customary law. He said:

“All law is originally formed in the manner in which in ordinary but not quote correct language, customary law is said to have been formed”.

2. Criticism

Savigny’s view that volkgeist is the source of all law is not totally true. Sometimes, an alien legal system is successfully transplanted in another, for instance:

• German Civil Code has been adopted in Japan, the Swiss code in Turkey, and French Code in Egypt without any apparent violence to popular susceptibilities.
• The reception of English law in so many parts of the world is also evidence is supra national adaptability and reliance.

A inconsistency in Savigny’s work that he was the protagonist at the Volkgeist doctrine, but at the same time he worked for the acceptance of a purified Roman Law as the law of Germany.

C. RECEPTION OF COMMON LAW IN INDIA

Indian legal system has received common law of England. The reception of English law in India is evidence of supra national adaptability and resilience. The general reception of English common law in India did not include English common family law. This means the successful of alien systems into India affected the indigenous family laws least of all.

1. Impact

No judicial system in any country is wholly immune from and unaffected by outside influence, nor can such outside influence be always looked upon as a bare. The reception of common law in India, however, gas given some influences into the existed law. The Gandhian expressed that it has replaced the quick, cheap and efficient “panchayat justice with expensive and slow courts which promote endless dishonestly and degrade public morality.

Furthermore, around eighty percents of Indians who lives in village wouldn’t understand the complexities of amendments (legal education literary) and Indian Legal System (ILS) became a subordinate almost a vassal legal system.

2. Search for Alternatives

Some Indian people argue that the present system of administration of justice does not accord with the pattern of Indian life and condition. In answer this criticism, Law Commission of India observes that the system which has prevail in India for nearly two centuries thought British in its origin has grown and developed in Indian condition and it is now firmly rooted in the Indian soil.

It would be disastrous and entirely destructive of Indian future growth to think of radical change at this stage of the development of India. The true remedy lies in removing the defects that exists in the present system and making it subserve in a greater degree for the present and the future.

To a limited extent, however, it is possible to utilize some of the simple features of judicial administration that obtained in the post. They refer to the popular courts or as they are turned today, The Nyanya Panchayats.

***

REFERENCES:

1. Eorsy, Gy., Comparative (Private) Law (1979), pp. 562-568.
2. Stone, Julius, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966), pp. 86-118.
3. David Rand Brierly E.C., Major Legals System in the World Today (1985), 3rd ed., pp. 485-515.
4. Derret J.D.M., “Justice, Equity and Good Conscience” in Anderson, editor, Changing Law in Developing Societies, pp. 11-53.
5. Glanter, M., “The Aborted Restoration of Indigenous Law in India” in Comparative Studies in Society and Histroy (1972), pp. 53-67.
6. Baxi, Upendra, The Crisis of the Indian Legal System (1982), pp. 41-47.
7. Law Commission of Indian, 14th Report (1985) Vol. 1, pp. 24-34; and 77th Report (1978), pp. 7-10.
8. etc.

PRATIBHA DEVISINGH PATIL, PRESIDEN WANITA PERTAMA DI INDIA

Dilahirkan di sebuah kota kecil bernama Jalgaon, Maharashtra pada 19 Desember 1934, Paratibha Devisingh Patil merupakan wanita yang sangat aktif sejak berumur 13 tahun, masa di mana India baru saja memperoleh kemerdekaannya. Ia menempuh pendidikan di Jalgaon dan Mumbai untuk mencapai gelar pascasarjana di bidang hukum dan kemudian terjun menjadi praktisi hukum sebagai advokat di Jalgaon.

Ayahnya merupakan penuntut umum pada Kepolisian India yang mengajarkan kedisiplinan tinggi agar menjadi anak yang ramah di dalam hubungan keluarga. Tidak ada satupun dari anggota keluarganya yang mempunyai hubungan dengan kalangan politisi, sebelum akhirnya ia terlibat pada kegiatan sosial yang bermuara pada komunitas politisi Partai Congress. Mengawali karirnya, ia terpilih menjadi anggota majelis negara bagian Maharastha pada tahun 1962 hingga 1985.

Semenjak menjadi anggota partai Congress, karir Pratibha terus menanjak. Pada tahun 1985 ia terpilih sebagai anggota Rajya Sabha, Parlemen kamar atas India, dan menjadi Deputy Chairperson Rajya Sabha pada tahun 1986 selama dua tahun berturut-turut. Di tahun 1991 ia terpilih kembali menjadi anggota parlemen, namun kini pada Lok Sabha, Parlemen kamar rendah India.

Pergulatannya di bidang politk tidak saja berhenti sampai di Lok Sabha, tepat pada tanggal 8 November 2004 ia menjadi Gubernur Rajasthan. Salah satu kebijakannya yang cukup kontroversial dan bersejarah pada saat itu yaitu penolaknnya terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Kebebasan Beragama yang berisi larangan terjadinya perpindahan dari suatu agama ke agama lainnya. Ia berpendapat bahwa hal tersebut merupakan ketentuan yang mempengaruhi, baik secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, fundamental rights warga negara terkait dengan kebebasan beragama.

Sebelum pada jabatannya yang terakhir, ia seringkali memegang posisi penting dan terlibat langsung dengan berbagai kegiatan di bidang sosial dan kebudayaan. Beberapa di antaranya yaitu, mendirikan Working Women Hostel di Bombay, Women’s Co-Operative Bank at Jalgaon, Engineering College di Jalgaon, dan berbagai sekolah, di mana kesemuanya itu diperuntukan untuk memperoleh manfaat bagi pemuda di daerah pedalaman. Pratibha Patil mempunyai keahlian khusus dalam hal pengembangan ekonomi kedaerahan dan peningkatan kesejahteraan wanita. Pada bulan Juli yang lalu, ia mengambil sumpah sebagai Presiden India dan mencatatkan sejarah sebagai Presiden wanita pertama pada negara demokrasi terbesar di dunia.

GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

The doctrine of judicial review has been originated and developed by the American Supreme Court, although there is no express provision in the American Constitution for the judicial review. In Marbury v. Madison,[1] the Supreme Court made it clear that it had the power of judicial review. Chief Justice George Marshall said,

“Certainly all those who have framed the written Constitution contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nations, and consequently, the theory of every such Government must be that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution is void”.

There is supremacy of Constitution in U.S.A. and, therefore, in case of conflict between the Constitution and the Acts passed by the legislature, the Courts follow the Constitution and declare the acts to be unconstitutional and, therefore, void. The Courts declare void the acts of the legislature and the executive, if they are found in violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

A. Meaning

Judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of judges. It comprises the power of a court to hold unconstitutional and unenforceable any law or order based upon such law or any other action by a public authority which is inconsistent or in conflict with the basic law of the land.

Kailash Rai defines judicial review as the authority of the Courts to declare void the acts of the legislature and executive, if they are found in the violation of the provisions of the Constitution. Judicial Review is the power of the highest Court of a jurisdiction to invalidate on Constitutional grounds, the acts of other Government agency within that jurisdicition.[2]

Broadly speaking, judicial review in India deals with three aspects: (i) judicial review of legislative action; (ii) judicial review of judicial decision; and (iii) judicial review of administrative action.[3] In this short-paper, we are concerned with the last aspect, namely, judicial review of administrative action.

It is necessary to distinguish between ‘judicial review’ and ‘judicial control’. The term judicial review has a restrictive connotation as compared to the term judicial control. Judicial review is ‘supervisory’, rather than ‘corrective’, in nature. Judicial review is denoted by the writ system which functions in India under Arts. 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Judicial control, on the other hand, is a broader term. It denotes a much broader concept and includes judicial review within itself. Judicial control comprises of all methods through which a person can seek relief against the Administration through the medium of the courts, such as, appeal, writs, declaration, injunction, damages statutory remedies against the Administration.[4]

B. Object

The underlying object of judicial review is to ensure that the authority does not abuse its power and the individual receives just and fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority reaches a conclusion which is correct in the eye of law.

As observed by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India[5], the Constitution has created an independent judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of administrative action and the validity of legislation. It is the solemn duty of the judiciary under the Constitution to keep different organs of the State within the limits of the power conferred upon them by the Constitution by exercising power of judicial review as sentinel on the quo vive. Thus, judicial review aims to protect citizens from abuse or misuse of power by any branch of the state.

Judicial quest in administrative matters is to strike the just balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters as per government policy, and the need of fairness. Any unfair action must be set right by administrative review.[6]

C. Judicial Review, Appeal and Revision

It should be remembered that the object and scope of judicial review of administrative action is different from that of appeal. The object of judicial review of administrative action by the ordinary courts is to keep the administrative authorities within the bounds of their powers under the law. Appeal, on the other hand, means that the superior administrative tribunal or court to whom appeal lies under the law, has the power to reconsider the decision of the inferior tribunal on the merits. Appeal, however, is a creature of statue and there is no right of appeal unless there is a specific statutory provision creating that right.[7]

The power of revision is usually placed at the hands of the highest authority, e.g., the State Government, to correct any illegality or irregularity in the proceedings before the inferior authorities. There are: (a) Sometimes the statue expressly states that the power of revision may be exercised suo motu as well as on the application of the party aggrieved; (b) Sometimes the statue only authorizes the superior authority to use his power or revision suo motu or of his own motion, e.g., original s. 33 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In such a case the party aggrieved has no right to relief and the revisional authority has no duty to perform, on the application of such party; (c) Difficulty of interpretation arises where neither the words ‘suo motu’, nor ‘on application’ are used by the statue.[8]

D. Nature and Scope

Judicial review of administrative action is perhaps the most important development in the field of public law in the second half of this century. In India, the doctrine of judicial review is the basic feature of Indian Constitution. Judicial review is the most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for the maintenance of the rule of law. Judicial review is the touchstone of the Constitution. The Supreme Court and High Courts are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. It is, therefore, their duty to find out the extent and limits of the power of coordinate branches, viz. executive and legislature and to see that they do not transgress their limits. This is indeed a delicate task assigned to the judiciary by the Constitution. Judicial review is thus the touchstone and essence of the rule of law.

The power of judicial review is an integral part of Indian Constitutional system and without it, there will be no government laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. The judicial review, therefore, is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution.[9]

In judicial review, the court is not concerned with the merits or correctness of the decision, but with the manner in which the decision is taken or order is made. A court of law is not exercising appellate power and it cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the authority deciding the matter. The areas where judicial power can operate are limited to keep the executive and legislature within the scheme of division of powers depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The dimension of judicial review must remain flexible.

It is a cardinal principle of Indian Constitution that no one howsoever highly placed and no authority lofty can claim to be the sole judge of its power under the Constitution. The rule of law requires that the exercise power by the legislature or buy the judiciary or by the government or by any other authority must be conditioned by the Constitution. Judicial review is thus the touchstone and repository of the supreme law of the land.

In recent times, judicial review of administrative action has become extensive and expansive. The traditional limitations have vanished and the sphere of judicial scrutiny is being expanded. Under the old theory, the courts used to exercise power only in cases of absence or excess or abuse of power. As the State activities have become pervasive and giant public corporations have come in existence, the stake of public exchequer justifies larger public audit and judicial control.[10]

The scope of judicial review in India is not a wide as in USA. The American Supreme Court can declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in “due process of law”, but the Indian Supreme Court has no such power. In India, outside the limitation imposed on the legislative powers, Parliament and State legislature are supreme in their respective legislative fields and the Court has no authority to question the wisdom or policy of the law duly made by the appropriate legislature. Another reason is because the Indian Supreme Court has consistently refused to declare legislative enactments invalid on the ground that they violate the natural, social or political rights of citizens, unless it could be shown that such injustice was expressly prohibited by the Constitution.[11]

E. Justiciability

Judicial review must be distinguished from justiciability. The two concepts are nor synonymous. The power of judicial review goes to the authority of the court and can be exercised by the court in appropriate cases.

Justiciability is not a legal concept with fixes contents, nor is it susceptible of scientific verification. There is not and there cannot be a uniform rule regarding scope and reach of judicial review applicable to all cases. It varies from case to case depending upon subject-matter, nature of right and other relevant factors.

The power of judicial review relates to the jurisidcition of the court whereas justiciablity is hedged by self-imposed judicial restraint. A court exercising judicial review may refrain to exercise its power if it finds that the controversy raised before it is not based on judicially discoverable and manageable standards. Moreover, the area of justicibiality can be reduced or curtailed. Even when, exercise of power is bad, the court in its discretion decline to grant relief considering the facts and circumstances of the case.[12]

F. Limitations

Judicial review has certain inherent limitations. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provision of the Constitution.

The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legalist. It has to consider whether a decision-making authority exceeded its power, committed an error of law, violated rules of natural justice, and reached a decision which no reasonable man would have reached or otherwise abused its powers. Though the court is not expected to act as a court of appeal, nevertheless, it can examine whether the “decision-making process” was reasonable, rational, not arbitrary or not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the authority has faultered in its wisdom, the court cannot act as super auditor.

Unless the order passed by an administrative authority is unlawful or unconstitutional, power of judicial review cannot be exercised. An order of administration may be right or wrong. It is the administrator’s right to trial and error and so long as it is bonafide and within the limits of the authority, no interference is called for. In short, power of judicial review is supervisory in nature. Unless this restriction is observed, the court, under the guise of preventing abuse of power by the administrative authority, will itself be guilty of usurping power.

Bernard Schwarts rightly stated:[13]

“If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts. That would destroy the values of agencies created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in complicated fields. At the same time, the scope of judicial inquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full inquiry into the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless. It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant. … It reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint.”

G. Conclusion

It is fundamental principle of law that every power must be exercised within the four corners of law and within the legal limits. Exercise of administrative power is not an exception to that basic rule. The doctrines by which those limits are ascertained and enforced form the very marrow of administrative law. Unfettered discretion cannot exist where the rule of law reigns. Again, all power is capable of abuse, and that the power to prevent the abuse is the acid test of effective judicial review.[14]

Under the traditional theory, courts of law used to control existence and extend of prerogative power but not the manner of exercise thereof. That position was, however, considerably modified after the decision in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service[15], wherein it was emphasized that the reviewability of discretionary power must depend upon the subject-matter and not upon its source. The extent and degree of judicial review and justifiable area may vary from case to case.[16]

At the same time, however, the power of judicial review is not unqualified or unlimited. If the courts were to assume jurisdiction to review administrative acts which are ‘unfair’ in their opinion (on merits), the courts would assume jurisdiction to do the very thing which is to be done by administration. If judicial review were to trespass on the merits of the exercise of administrative power, it would put its own legitimacy at risk.

It is submitted that the following observations of Frankfurter, I. in Trop v. Dulles,[17] lay down correct legal position:

“All power is, in Madison’s Phrase ‘of an encroaching nature’. Judicial Power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only restraint upon it is self restraint.”

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END NOTES:

[1] 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
[2] Kailash Rai, Administrative Law, Allahabad Law Agency, Haryana, 2006, p. 395. See also L.P. Berths, Constitution and the Supreme Court, p. 16.
[3] C.K. Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2003, p. 236.
[4] M.P. Jain and S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law: An Exhaustive Commentary on the Subject containing case-law reference (Indian & Foreign), 6th Ed., Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, New Delhi, 2007, p. 1779.
[5] (1980) 3 SCC 625 (677-78): AIR 1980 SC 1789 (1925-26). See also Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 (574-75): AIR 1981 SC 344 (347).
[6] Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651: AIR 1996 SC 11, 13.
[7] Durga Das Basu, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Kamal Law House, Calcutta, 1998, p. 413.
[8] Ibid, p. 412.
[9] C.K. Takwani, Supra note no. 3, p. 237.
[10] Ibid., pp. 237-238.
[11] M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India, p. 379.
[12] Ibid, p. 239.
[13] Administrative Law, 2nd Edn., p. 584 cited in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 (680): AIR 1996 SC 11, 13.
[14] Wade, Administrative Law, (1994), pp. 39-41.
[15] (1984) 3 All ER 935: (1984) 3 WLR 1174: (1985) AC 374.
[16] Craig, Administrative Law, (1993), p. 291.
[17] (1985) 35 US 86.

MAIN REFERENCES:

• Basu, Durga Das, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Kamal Law House, Calcutta, 1998.
• Jain, M.P. and S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law: An Exhaustive Commentary on the Subject containing case-law reference (Indian & Foreign), 6th Ed., Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, New Delhi, 2007.
• Rai, Kailash, Administrative Law, Allahabad Law Agency, Haryana, 2006.
• Takwani, C.K., Lectures on Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2003.
• etc.